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LL.B./ M.E.S. candidate
September 17, 1998
Potential implications
of future WTO negotiations
for North American broadcasting
An Overview(1)
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUMMARY
The paper addresses this research question:
· What is the potential impact of upcoming WTO negotiations for broadcasting in
North America, particularly in the areas of trade in services and investment?
The short answer to this question is that WTO negotiations may lead to expanded trade
agreements(2) which will further restrict government lawmaking authority over broadcasting.  If
applied to broadcasting without exception, trade principles would impact very dramatically on a
wide range of broadcasting policies(3) which presently exist in North America.
1) Direct policy impact
Among the policies that may be directly affected are:
· Foreign ownership restrictions in broadcasting,
· Bilateral co-production treaties,
· Public funding targeted towards domestic production companies,
· Requirements to favour the hiring of disadvantaged groups (i.e. women, aboriginal
peoples, disabled persons, and visible minorities),
 
2· Requirements to broadcast minimum levels of domestic content,
· Requirements to contribute to production funds to support domestic content,
· Any definition of domestic content which favours domestic performers, directors,
producers, writers, music composers, etc.; in short,
· Any form of preferential treatment for domestic persons or companies.
See Part E for details.
2) Rights to sue for compensation
Importantly, WTO agreements may give new rights for foreign interests(4) to sue governments in
front of international arbitration panels or domestic courts for violations of a trade agreement.
These rights would likely include the right to seek monetary damages from governments to
compensate for an “expropriation of assets”.  An “expropriation” could take place directly or
indirectly, as a result of a government law, regulation, policy, administrative decision or other
measure.  “Assets” may be defined more broadly than in current agreements, to include
intellectual property rights, license rights, or any tangible and intangible property rights.(5)  See
Part E(3).
For example, the Canadian federal government might be open to a lawsuit if the CRTC revoked a
foreign-owned broadcasting license, or chose to apply broadcasting policies to a previously
exempt sector or technology.
3) Other potential implications
Among other potential implications, the WTO agreements may give special rights and protections
to foreign interests which domestic persons and companies do not enjoy.  See Part F(3).
They could also require the re-opening of broadcast licensing arrangements to foreign companies
in “full” radio markets.  See Part E(2).
They may “freeze” or apply a time limit to broadcasting policies, thus precluding governments
from applying current policies to new technologies.  See Part E(4).
Finally, they may include a relatively long “lock in”, such as 15 years.  See Appendix One (Note
149).
3Fundamentally, this paper seeks to make clear the sheer breadth of the potential impact of future
WTO agreements.  The paper’s assessment is rooted in a review of both current and proposed
trade agreements, as well as analyses of these agreements by various legal and academic
sources.(6)
B. INTRODUCTION
1) The “Millennium Round” of WTO negotiations
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1994, at the end of the Uruguay Round of
world trade negotiations.  The next round of WTO negotiations will begin no later than January
2000.  Meetings are already taking place as national governments shape their negotiating strategy
in anticipation of this “Millennium Round”.
The WTO negotiations promise to address many topics that are relevant to broadcasting,
revolving around: (1) the possible expansion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)(7) and (2) the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on investment, based on the
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).(8)  This paper does not directly address a
number of other relevant topics likely to be negotiated at the WTO, including: (1) intellectual
property rights, (2) subsidies, (3) government procurement, and (4) competition policy.
2) Intent and methodology
The paper provides a broad, speculative assessment of the potential impact of upcoming WTO
negotiations on broadcasting.  Nothing in this paper represents a legal opinion as the author is a
law student and not a lawyer.  Rather, the paper represents an informed forecast of the future,
based on a review of various analyses of current and proposed trade agreements.
4It is hazardous to speculate about the impact of upcoming negotiations of any sort, let alone
broad-based multilateral negotiations on international trade.  Negotiations are confidential, for
obvious reasons, and last minute offers may alter the shape of an agreement dramatically.  The
task is even more complex in a rapidly evolving sector like broadcasting, given the whirlwind of
technological change and industry convergence underway.
However, the sheer breadth of the potential impact of WTO negotiations warrants a careful and
informed assessment of the implications for broadcasting.  This paper is modeled, in a very
modest way, after the in-depth “anticipatory” analysis of the MAI prepared in 1997 for the
Western Governors’ Association (WGA), by T. Singer and P. Orbuch.  According to the WGA
report:
Our approach is to rely not only on the stated intent of MAI negotiators, but to anticipate
how the language of MAI proposals might be interpreted by future dispute panels or
courts in response to legal claims brought by investors.  This approach is necessary
because a core purpose of the MAI is to legally empower investors to seek their own
remedies and make their own arguments against state laws without mediation by their
home governments.(9)
3) Research plan
Based on the above approach, the research plan for the paper was to:
(a) Review the treatment of broadcasting in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),
(b) Review the negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
during the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations,
(c) Review the final decisions of the WTO Panel and WTO Appellate Body in the case of
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
(d) Synthesize various analyses of the potential impact of a Multila eral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and
5(e) Assess how trade principles applied in the NAFTA, GATS or  the proposed MAI
might impact on broadcasting policies in North America.
This research was carried out over a seven-week period.  The paper was written during the
remaining three weeks of the Fellowship.
4) Sources
The paper relies on academic, legal, government, industry and other non-governmental sources,
especially the “anticipatory” legal analyses provided by a number of these sources.
The author also benefited from presentations on trade and broadcasting at a North American
National Broadcasters Association (NANBA) meeting in June, 1998;(10) discussions on trade
and culture at a recent conference held by the Canadian Conference of the Arts (CCA);(11) and
several interviews with representatives of Canadian government and industry during August
1998.(12)
The Ethyl case - An illustration
The Canadian government recently agreed to settle a $250 million (U.S.) NAFTA lawsuit
launched by Ethyl Corporation, a company based in Richmond, Virginia.(13)
Ethyl had sued Canada after the federal government banned the import or inter-provincial sale of
the gasoline additive MMT, which is manufactured by the company.  The Canadian government
claimed at the time that MMT was an environmental hazard because it gums up automobile
emission controls.  Ethyl responded with a legal challenge under the NAFTA Chapter on
investment, seeking compensation for “expropriation” of its assets and damage to its reputation.
Under the settlement, the Canadian government agreed to drop its MMT ban, pay Ethyl $10
million for legal costs and lost profits, and issue a public statement that the gasoline additive is
not a threat to the environment or human health.  In return, Ethyl agreed to drop the NAFTA
challenge.
6NAFTA is the first major trade agreement that allows investors to sue a foreign government
directly, and the Ethyl case is the first NAFTA case to have caught the public eye.  Other trade
agreements require the home government of a company to bring suits on the company’s behalf.
The case shows how trade agreements are changing the rules for how a government can regulate
foreign companies.  Current and future negotiations - such as those at the WTO - may entrench
and expand upon the rights and protections put in place under NAFTA.
C. PAST TRADE AGREEMENTS
This section provides a few words on current and proposed trade agreements, namely NAFTA,
the GATS, and the MAI, to provide a reference point for upcoming WTO negotiations on trade in
services and investment.(14)
1) NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)(15) set a precedent for other multilateral
negotiations on both trade in services and investment.(16)  It was signed in 1994 between
Canada, Mexico and the United States.
(i) Provisions on services
In the area of trade in services, NAFTA’s Chapter 12 applies various trade principles, including
MFN Treatment, National Treatment, and Market Access [see Part E(1)].  These provisions
helped to lay the track for the negotiation of the GATS in 1993-94 [see below].(17)
The U.S. referred to the NAFTA provisions on services when it threatened to retaliate against a
1994 Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) decision to
remove an American specialty television channel from the Canadian airwaves.(18)
(ii) Provisions on investment
7In the area of investment, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 applies various trade principles, including MFN
Treatment, National Treatment, Market Access, a Prohibition on Performance Requirements, and
Expropriation of Assets [see Part E(1)].  The NAFTA investment provisions set the stage for the
negotiation of a comprehensive multilateral agreement on investment, such as the MAI [see
below] or a future WTO agreement on investment.(19)
The recently-settled Ethyl lawsuit against Canada [see above] was initiated under the NAFTA
provisions on investment.
(iii) Cultural exception
The NAFTA provisions on services and investment would have a dramatic impact on
broadcasting policies in North America, if not for the agreement’s “cultural exception”.
Annex 2106 of NAFTA establishes the “cultural exception” by referring any question on
“cultural industries” to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).(20)  Article 2005 of the
FTA, in turn, exempts “cultural industries” (including broadcasting)(21) from the provisions of
the agreement, but with a serious limitation, since it allows an opposing Party to take retaliatory
sanctions against any use of the cultural exception.(22)
Thus, the true breadth of the exception remains an open question.  According to one
commentator, “What Article 2005 says, in reality, is that if a Party is ready to pay the price, it can
maintain cultural measures that are incompatible with the Agreement”.(23)  Neither Canada nor
the United States have invoked the cultural exception, and the degree to which it would protect
broadcasting policies is unclear.(24)
The NAFTA “cultural exception” only applies between Canada and the U.S., and between
Canada and Mexico.(25)  Mexico, for its part, was able to negotiate a country-specific reservation
for certain government measures designed to protect the use of the Spanish language in radio and
television.(26)
2) GATS
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first multilateral agreement to
establish comprehensive rules on trade in services (as opposed to goods).(27)  The negotiations
8towards its completion in 1993-94 demonstrate the controversy which would surround a future
push at the WTO to apply trade principles to broadcasting as an “audiovisual service”.(28)
(i) Audiovisual services
Audiovisual services were among the most contentious topics during the GATS negotiation, with
a gulf developing between the United States and the European Union/ Canada over the treatment
of a number of cultural areas.  The U.S. favoured the application of trade principles to audiovisual
services, while the E.U./ Canada sought to maintain government lawmaking authority over
broadcasting by supporting a general exception for audiovisual services.(29)
(ii) Resolution
The negotiations ended in “a compromise which wasn’t really a compromise”.(30)  Thus, the
GATS contains no general exception for culture but does allow countries to withhold specific
commitments on audiovisual services.(31)  The U.S. was one of three industrialized countries to
make substantial commitments to National Treatment and Market Access for audiovisual
services.(32)  Canada, along with the E.U., withheld any specific commitments in audiovisual
services.(33)
These divisions over the treatment of audiovisual services will inevitably re-surface during future
WTO negotiations, with important potential implications for broadcasting.
3) MAI
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)(34) is a draft agreement proposed by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  It is revealing for two
reasons.  First, it anticipates the future direction which a WTO investment agreement might take.
Second, it proposes new trade principles and enforcement mechanisms, which expand the scope
of the potential impact of a comprehensive investment agreement on broadcasting.
(i) Origins
9The Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations did not lead to a broad agreement on investment,
mainly because of opposition from developing countries.(35)  Instead, a narrow WTO agreement
was concluded, called the Agr ement on Trade-Related Investment Measures [TRIMS].(36)
After the Uruguay Round, negotiations towards a broad investment agreement were shifted to the
OECD.(37)  Negotiations among the 29 OECD members(38) began in 1995 towards a MAI.
They were slated for completion, but later postponed, in both May 1997 and May 1998.(39)  The
MAI may yet be signed at the OECD.(40)
(ii) Proposed cultural exception
France proposed a broad exception for cultural sectors (including broadcasting) under the MAI,
which reads:(41)
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party to take any
measure to regulate investment of foreign companies and the conditions of activity of
these companies, in the framework of policies designed to preserve and promote cultural
and linguistic diversity.
It is not clear how this proposal will fare under continuing negotiations, although the United
States has announced its intention to oppose a cultural exception.(42)  Canada supports the
French proposal and has indicated that if a general exception is not agreed to, it will take a
country-specific reservation for culture.(43)
(iii) Relevance
Various commentators have reported that the MAI was a substantially complete work prior to its
postponement in May 1998, and that it indicates the broader context and climate of international
negotiations towards future trade agreements.(44)  I have summarized some key elements of the
MAI in Appendix One.
The MAI sheds light on how a broad WTO agreement on investment might unfold.  In 1996, the
Singapore Ministerial Declaration of the WTO established a working group on investment, and
this “is widely regarded as having sown the seeds for the negotiations of an MAI under the
domain of the WTO”.(45)  I have therefore relied heavily on analyses of the MAI in order to
forecast how future WTO agreements may impact on broadcasting, as described below [Parts E
and F].
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D. CANADA-U.S. DYNAMIC
1) Canadian broadcasting policies
Much of this paper’s assessment of the potential impact of future WTO agreements has an
unavoidable focus on Canadian broadcasting policies.  Why unavoidable?
According to one Canadian commentator, Canada’s cultural policies are among the most
elaborate in the world, for two reasons.  First, Canada’s small size means that it is inherently
limited in its ability to amortize the cost of domestic programming.  Second, this problem is
aggravated by the country’s proximity to the United States, which means that Canadian content
has to compete with a range of well-marketed foreign programming, the costs of which can be
amortized in the largest entertainment market in the world.(46)  At present, over 60 percent of
programs on Canadian television are foreign, the vast majority from the United States.(47)
Thus, the potential impact of trade principles on broadcasting policies promises to be greater in
Canada than in Mexico or the United States.  Hence the focus on Canadian policies in this paper.
2) U.S. perspective
The United States has pushed hard for trade agreements which would remove broadcasting
policies in other countries, viewing them as a barrier to open markets and the free flow of trade
and investment.(48)  Entertainment products are, of course, one of the most important American
exports.(49)  In comparison, Canada spends about twice as much on cultural imports than it earns
from cultural exports, despite some export growth in recent years.(50)
3) WTO decision on Canadian magazine policies
The 1997 WTO case on Ca ada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals demon trates the
divisions between the Canadian and U.S. positions on trade and culture.(51)  Canada’s policies
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had the effect of preventing the import of American magazines which contained “recycled
content” from the U.S. market.
According to Canada, Canadian-content magazines would not be able to attract Canadian
advertisers if forced to compete with the “recycled content” of imported American magazines,
whose costs were already paid for in the U.S. market.  This form of competition is unfair, says the
argument, and would virtually drive the Canadian magazine industry out of business.  The
purpose of the policies, for Canada, “is not to protect the production of periodicals in Canada, but
to prevent the diversion of advertising revenues to magazines based on content produced for
foreign markets, and thus to ensure the production of editorial content for Canadians”.(52)
Essentially, this was an argument that a global free market would wipe out domestic content in
small countries, thus harming cultural and linguistic diversity.
The United States argued that the benefits of the economies of scale should outweigh any cultural
concerns in the era of free trade.  As the U.S. stated:
...even if one could somehow credit Canada’s argument that it is seeking... to ensure
‘original content’ in magazines sold in Canada this purpose would be equally illegitimate.
If GATT permitted governments to require that imported goods be designed exclusively
or primarily for their markets, they could easily insulate their markets from the
comparative economic advantages of other WTO Members.  Such a result would
undermine the foundations of international trade.(53)
These divergent positions illustrate some of the underlying arguments surrounding future WTO
negotiations on trade and broadcasting, as part of the debate on trade and culture.
E. POTENTIAL IMPACT
1) Introduction
(i) Basis for the report’s predictions
This paper provides an “anticipatory” analysis of future WTO agreements, based on a review of
current and proposed trade agreements, especially NAFTA, the GATS and the proposed MAI.
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Current agreements like NAFTA and the GATS contain a general exception and/ or country-
specific reservations on broadcasting, thus limiting their policy impacts in important ways.  The
paper’s predictions assume that future WTO agreements would apply the trade principles of
NAFTA, GATS and the MAI to broadcasting, w thout exceptions.  This is entirely speculative,
since it is unclear what kinds of exceptions will be negotiated in future agreements.  However, a
broad approach is critical to anticipating the full breadth of the potential impact of WTO
agreements on broadcasting.  In fact, the paper may only reveal the tip of the iceberg of the
WTO’s potential impact, since it is not based on a full-scale review of broadcasting policies
across North America.
(ii) Summary of trade principles(54)
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment requires that a government treat the persons or the companies
of a trade partner no less favourably than those of any other trade partner.(55)
National Treatment requires that a government treat foreign interests no less favourably than it
treats domestic persons or companies.(56)  Government programs which favour domestic persons
or companies are said to be “discriminatory” against their foreign counterparts.
An effects test expands National Treatment by requiring that the effects of a government
measure, as well as its purpose, not discriminate against foreign interests.(57)
Uniform National Treatment expands National Treatment by requiring “uniform treatment” of
foreign interests within national borders.  Thus, if subnational governments (i.e. local, provincial,
state, territorial) provide varying standards of treatment within a country, then foreign interests
are entitled to the best subnational treatment available, no matter where in the country they
operate.(58)
Market Access requires a government to allow foreign interests to enter its national market, free
from a number of direct or indirect limitations.(59)  This principle is also referred to as the
application of National Treatment during the pre-establishment phase of an investment.  This is
also described as “freedom of entry” and “right of establishment”.
A Prohibition on Performance Requirements prevents a government from placing requirements
on foreign interests related to employment; investment; export; transfer of technology; or local
sales, content, and production.(60)
Expropriation of Assets provides for the protection of foreign investors from expropriation or “a
measure tantamount to...expropriation” of an investment.(61)  The principle may be defined
broadly in order to “serve as a safeguard against new forms of expropriation in the future”.(62)
General exceptions are negotiated to remove broad areas of government lawmaking authority
from the rules of the agreement, for all country-members.(63)
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Country-specific reservations are negotiated to remove more narrow areas of government
lawmaking authority from the rules of the agreement, for a particular country-member.(64)
A standstill provision(65) freezes any exceptions or reservations to the agreement, by prohibiting
any future government measures in the excepted area.
A rollback provision(66) phases out any exceptions or reservations to the agreement over a period
of time.
(iii) Summary of potential impact
If future WTO agreements apply currently-recognized or proposed trade principles to
broadcasting without exception, their impact would:
· Remove foreign ownership restrictions,
· Prohibit bilateral co-production treaties,
· Require the re-opening of “full” radio markets to foreign interests,
 
· Prohibit any definition of domestic content which favours domestic actors, directors,
writers, producers, musicians, composers, and so on,
· Prohibit requirements to broadcast minimum levels of domestic content,
· Prohibit requirements to contribute to production funds to support domestic content,
· Prohibit public subsidies which are targeted towards domestic companies,
· Prohibit requirements to favour the hiring of disadvantaged groups (i.e. women,
aboriginal peoples, disabled persons, and visible minorities),
 
· Allow foreign investors to sue governments directly,
· Require compensation for an “expropriation” of a broadcasting license,
 
· Prevent governments from applying current broadcasting policies to new technologies,
· Provide rights to foreign interests which their domestic counterparts do not enjoy,
 
· Put a freeze (“standstill”) on the future use of exceptions, or
· Put a time limit (“rollback”) on exceptions.
2) Direct policy impact
(i) Foreign ownership restrictions
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Most countries have placed strong restrictions on foreign ownership of broadcasting.(67)
The United States, for example, restricts foreign ownership to 20 percent of a company with a
broadcasting or carrier license, and 25 percent of a company controlled by such a company.  A
foreign interest in a company which exceeds 25 percent is subject to review and approval by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) according to the public interest.(68)
Canada restricts foreign ownership to 20 percent of a broadcasting company and 33.3 percent of a
broadcaster’s holding company, to a combined maximum of 46.7 percent.(69)  Also, the CRTC
reviews transfers of ownership of broadcasting companies,(70) and applies a “benefits test” to
evaluate whether the transfers “are beneficial to the public... and to the Canadian broadcasting
system as a whole”.(71)
Impact of National Treatment and Market Access:
Foreign ownership restrictions on broadcasting would violate the principles of National
Treatment and Market Access.
(ii) Co-production treaties
Bilateral co-production treaties in television have been signed between a number of countries.
Their main purpose is to promote joint productions between the countries by pooling sources of
financing and by allowing for reciprocal recognition of domestic content.(72)  Canada, as a prime
example, has signed co-production treaties with over forty countries.(73)
Impact of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment:
These treaties would conflict with the principle of MFN Treatment, since they give favourable
treatment to a trade partner which is not given to all other trade partners.  Under the GATS, 27
countries were permitted to take reservations for their film and television co-production treaties in
order to escape the impact of the agreement’s MFN provisions on those treaties.(74)
(iii) Broadcast licensing
In Canada, the CRTC has the power to issue or amend licenses to broadcasters.(75)
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Impact of provisions on Expropriation of Assets:
Under the MAI proposals on Expropriation of Assets, the removal or amendment of the
broadcasting license of a foreign investor could trigger a lawsuit against the government, seeking
monetary damages to compensate for any valuable assets (broadly defined) which the investor
had lost.(76)
Impact of National Treatment and Market Access:
In Canada, the CRTC applies a wide range of policies which give favourable treatment to
Canadian television companies and discriminate against foreign interests.  First, it limits the U.S.
television signals which cable companies may carry (limited to ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and
PBS).(77)  Second, it limits the number and type of U.S. satellite services that may be carried by
cable television, and the basis on which they can be sold.(78)  Third, it gives preference to the
licensing of Canadian pay and specialty channels over their foreign counterparts, and allows for
new Canadian channels to displace foreign channels which offer the same service.(79)
All of these policies would violate the principles of National Treatment and Market Access
because they favour domestic companies over foreign companies.
Finally, in some local radio markets, all of the available station frequencies have been licensed
out.  The markets have become “full” of domestically-owned radio stations.  This licensing
arrangement could be challenged under the MAI-proposed “effects test” for National Treatment,
since the arrangement has the effect of excluding new market entrants, to the disadvantage of
foreign interests.  A foreign investor could argue that the market became “full” before it had a
chance to apply for a license, and should therefore be re-opened.(80)
(iv) Domestic content policies
Canada requires broadcasters to include a minimum percentage of Canadian content in their
programming,(81) and defines “Canadian content” according to the number of Canadians who
play key roles in a production.  Points are awarded for having a Canadian performer, director,
writer, music composer, and so on.(82)  Canada also requires private broadcasters to make
contributions to production funds which support domestic content, as a condition of their
broadcasting license.(83)
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Mexico requires broadcasters to feature Mexican nationals in a majority of a day’s live programs,
and that any broadcast announcer who is not a Mexican national must obtain authorization to
perform in Mexico.(84)
Impact of National Treatment and a Prohibition on Performance Requirements:
A requirement to broadcast a minimum level of domestic content, or to favour domestic
performers in any other way, would conflict with a Prohibition on Performance Requirements to
use a minimum percentage of domestic content, as well as National Treatment.(85)  A
requirement for private broadcasters to contribute to production funds that support domestic
programming would conflict with the principles of National Treatment and a Prohibition on
Requirements to give a preference to domestic goods or services.(86)
The policies would likely be prohibited only with respect to foreign broadcasters.(87)  This could
lead to a comparative disadvantage for domestic broadcasters if they were required to broadcast
domestic content while foreign broadcasters were not.(88)
Impact of an “effects test” in National Treatment:
A definition of domestic content which favours domestic persons or companies would violate the
principles of National Treatment and Market Access.  However, such a definition might survive
the national treatment test if “domestic content” was defined in a way that allowed foreign
persons and companies to produce it, and was not explicitly discriminatory against foreign
interests.  Yet, even this type of definition could be challenged under the MAI-proposed “effects
test” for National Treatment.(89)
To illustrate, it could be argued under the MAI’s “effects test” that a definition of domestic
content which somehow required that content be about a local or domestic situation would have
the “effect” of giving significant advantage to domestic persons and companies, since they are
inherently better placed to produce this kind of content.  Thus, the definition would be
discriminatory, in its effect, against foreign interests and would violate National Treatment.
Under this scenario, it is difficult to imagine any criteria for “domestic content” which would
satisfy National Treatment under a broad “effects test”.
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In this context, it is worth recalling a U.S. argument in the WTO case on Canadian magazine
policies that:
If GATT permitted governments to require that imported goods be designed exclusively
or primarily for their markets, they could easily insulate their markets from the
comparative advantages of other WTO Members.  Such a result would undermine the
foundations of international trade.(90)
The U.S. argument, therefore, is that domestic content policies could be used as a shelter for
protectionism.  This argument prioritizes trade liberalization and open markets ahead of state
intervention to support domestic content and cultural diversity in broadcasting.
Impact of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment:
Domestic content policies could also violate MFN Treatment, if linked to a bilateral co-
production agreement [see section (2)(ii) above].  In Australia, a recent court decision struck
down the Australian Broadcasting Authority’s television content standard based on the MFN
provisions of a bilateral trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand.(91)
(v) “Simultaneous substitution”
Canada requires the “simultaneous substitution” by Canadian cable companies of U.S. television
signals with the domestic television signals that are showing the same program simultaneously, so
as to protect the owners of Canadian broadcasting rights.(92)
“Simultaneous substitution” could be challenged as a violation of National Treatment and Market
Access, since it discriminates against U.S. broadcasters and advertisers, and periodically excludes
them from the Canadian market.
(vi) Funding programs
Canada provides substantial funding, both public and private, to support Canadian programming.
The respective funds are available only to programs which have a minimum level of Canadian
participation and are Canadian-owned.(93)  The most important sources of funding are Telefilm
Canada and the Canadian Television and Cable Production Fund (CTCPF), as well as provincial
funding agencies.(94)
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Impact of National Treatment:
These funding programs violate National Treatment.  To meet the test of National Treatment,
they would have to be made open to foreign persons and companies on a non-discriminatory
basis.
Canada also prohibits tax deductions for the cost of advertising on foreign border stations.(95)  In
effect, this re-directs the Canadian advertising market to support Canadian broadcasters and has
been described as a “central support structure for the [television] industry”.(96)  However this
would violate National Treatment, since it gives favourable treatment to domestic stations.
Impact of “uniform” National Treatment:
Led by Quebec, provincial governments in Canada have created a number of funding programs to
support the cultural sector, including broadcasting.(97)  These programs would directly violate
National Treatment, under the MAI-proposed principle of “uniform” National Treatment, which
would require “‘full market access’ in the form of uniform treatment of foreign investors within
national borders”.(98)  Under  this principle, as an American analysis of the MAI points out:
The ability of laws and regulations to vary among states with regard to foreign investors
would like fail to comply with this version of national treatment under the argument that
it fragments the national market into as many as 50 regulatory submarkets.
In the Canadian context, the funding programs of Quebec and other provinces would either have
to be made available to foreign interests ation-wide or be eliminated to provide “uniform”
National Treatment.
(vii) Employment equity policies
The CRTC requires broadcasters, as a condition of license, to prepare employment equity plans
designed to increase the number of people which they hire from four disadvantaged groups:
women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and visible minorities.(99)
Impact of National Treatment and a Prohibition on Performance Requirements:
These policies could conceivably be challenged under National Treatment and a Prohibition on
Performance Requirements.(100)  Under the MAI’s proposals to ban performance requirements,
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for  example, governments would be prohibited from requiring a foreign investor to ensure
certain levels of local content or employment.(101)
3) Expansion of  enforcement regime
One of the main purposes of the WTO, created in 1994, is to provide an effective enforcement
mechanism for world trade agreements.
Thus, future WTO agreements could expand and strengthen enforcement provisions in the
multilateral trade regime.  The MAI, in particular, includes proposals for expanded  enforcement
provisions which may anticipate the future WTO agenda. These proposals would expand on the
current WTO enforcement process, which is based on a process of trade challenges between
national governments.
The MAI proposals grant new rights to foreign investors (mainly corporations) to directly sue the
government if a “government measure” harms their investor rights or protections under the
agreement.(102)  Foreign investors could launch a lawsuit both in international arbitration panels
and domestic courts, and would not require the consent of their home governments to do so.(103)
According to a report prepared for the U.S. Western Governors’ Association (WGA), the MAI
enforcement proposals would “create rights that are not now available to foreign investors
through American statutes or case law”.(104)  These rights would not be granted to domestic
persons or corporations under the MAI proposals.(105)
According to one legal opinion, the MAI proposals are:
likely  to result in investors carefully scrutinizing government practices to find a MAI
provision on which they can base a claim. Thus, policing of the MAI will move from
governmental channels over to businesses with enforcement done through the use of
international tribunals.(106)
The MAI proposals expand on the Investor-State enforcement process in NAFTA, which has
been described as “an untapped source of extensive private investor rights, including guaranteed
access to a NAFTA panel for a private party”.(107)  The recently-settled Ethyl lawsuit, discussed
above, was initiated under NAFTA [see Part (B) (1)].
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A number of  sources have expressed their concern that the threat of trade-based legal challenges
by foreign corporations will discourage governments from carrying out legitimate domestic
regulation in a range of areas, such as health, environment, regional development, as well as
cultural diversity.  One trade lawyer, for example, has commented that the “very broad terms” of
the MAI’s provisions on National Treatment “constrain legitimate government activities to assist
their own citizens”.(108)
4) Restrictions regarding new technologies
The treatment of new technologies is one of the most important issues at hand for broadcasters in
upcoming WTO negotiations, given the rate of technological changes in broadcasting.(109)  Most
governments have not yet defined their regulatory approach to new technologies.(110)  How will
future WTO agreements impact on government lawmaking authority in this area?  Most
importantly, how will trade agreements limit government authority over the Internet?
First, the definition of broadcasting in future WTO agreements may exclude the Internet.  In this
case, the Internet would be treated as a telecommunications service, which is already largely
subject to trade liberalization in other agreements.(111)
Second, the Internet could be included as part of an exception for broadcasting in future WTO
agreements, allowing governments to apply current policies to new technologies.  The exception,
however, might be limited by “standstill” and “rollback” provisions, as proposed in the MAI [see
Part 4(ii) below].
(i) U.S. and Canadian proposals
U.S. proposals have pushed for maximum free trade on the Internet, with government’s limited
role being to support and facilitate global electronic commerce, protect intellectual property, and
ensure privacy and security.(112)
The Canadian government has not yet decided how it will regulate new technologies like the
Internet.(113)  For cultural reasons, some sources have expressed concern about “the free flow of
digital content across the Canadian border” which might result from trade agreements, allowing
them to escape Canada’s broadcast policies.(114)
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One could envision a variety of current broadcasting policies which might be adapted to the
Internet.  For example: restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic Internet content or service
providers; government funding programs designed to support domestic new media companies;
requirements for Internet providers or users to contribute to a new media production fund to
support domestic content; licensing requirements for Internet service providers; or requirements
to provide adequate “shelf space” to domestic Internet content.  All of these possibilities,
however, could be pre-empted by trade agreements.
With respect to content on the Internet, the U.S. Government Administration has stated that it
will:
pursue dialogue with other nations on how to promote cultural diversity, including
cultural and linguistic diversity, without limiting content.  These discussions could
consider promotion of cultural identity through subsidy programs that rely solely on
general revenues and that are implemented in a nondiscriminatory manner.(115)
In a trade context, these comments suggest that subsidy programs would be limited in their scope,
since they could not rely on private funding arrangements or be targeted towards domestic
persons or companies, and that any definition of domestic content could not “discriminate”
against foreign interests.
(ii) Potential WTO impact
Future WTO agreements may restrict the authority of a government to apply current policies to
new technologies.
The proposed MAI provisions on Expropriation of Assets, for instance, aim to protect foreign
investors from expropriation or “any other measure having similar effect”.(116)  Under  the MAI,
the scope of this principle is intentionally broad in order to “serve as a safeguard against new
forms of expropriation in the future”.(117)  Thus, once a government permitted a foreign person
or company to establish itself in a new technological area (perhaps by means of a licensing
exemption), a later denial of a broadcasting license to the foreign broadcaster might trigger a
claim for monetary compensation for Expropriation of Assets.
In addition, country-specific reservations in broadcasting may be subject to “standstill” or
“rollback” limitations, as proposed in the MAI.(118)  These principles would freeze current
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policies, thus preventing their application to new technologies, or put a time limit on any policies
which might already apply to new technologies.(119)
F. OTHER OBSERVATIONS
1) Developing countries and the MAI
During the Uruguay Round, opposition to the proposals for a comprehensive WTO investment
agreement was led by developing countries.(120)  A discussion of the impact of the MAI on
North American broadcasting would not be complete without some treatment of the concerns
expressed by developing countries.
(i) Purpose of the MAI
According to one trade lawyer, the MAI’s purpose is:
to reduce or eliminate obstacles to foreign investment, open markets, eliminate
discriminatory treatment (both before and after establishment), reduce “country risk” and
reallocate capital to its most productive uses.(121)
In comparison, a former commerce minister from India states that “the main motive of the
industrialized countries behind an MAI is the gaining and consolidation of market access
opportunities for their business enterprises around the world”.(122)
Says another Indian Government commentator:
Investment policy addresses a host of complex and interrelated matters of national
importance: regional disparities, income inequalities, employment, environment, taxation
and social justice, to name a few... A multilateral investment framework would take away
the right of national governments to regulate and channel FDI [Foreign Direct
Investment] in the light of their own national developmental objectives.(123)
(ii) Infant industries
Developing countries have claimed in the past that an MAI would prevent the establishment of
their “infant industries”, and preclude state intervention that is needed to channel foreign
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investment to where it is economically most beneficial.  They risk having their markets flooded
by foreign companies due to the “huge competitive gap between their enterprises, particularly
small and medium enterprises, and the TNCs of the industrialized world”.(124)  According to one
source:
Selective and judicious intervention of the government is therefore widely considered
necessary to support or protect domestic industry and technology creation, sometimes
even to ensure a ‘level playing field’ for domestic enterprises.(125)
One response to this argument, provided by a Canadian trade law professor, is that a country does
not necessarily need a strong industrial sector in order to develop.  He states that:
In part, the infant industry argument rests on the proposition that an advanced, mature
economy cannot be predominantly dependent upon agricultural or natural resources for
its exports... However, it bears pointing out that some countries have sustained high
standards of living without substantial manufacturing sectors...(126)
(iii) Investor rights versus responsibilities
Industrialized countries have pushed for an MAI that recognizes investor rights and protections
after having consistently blocked efforts to establish a multilateral agreement on investor
responsibilities, as one developing country commentator has pointed out.  Past initiatives at the
UN to establish standards of conduct, behaviour and obligations for foreign investors, especially
transnational corporations (TNCs), were all made non-binding and voluntary codes, mainly at the
behest of the industrialized world.(127)
2) Impact on the CBC
The potential impact of WTO agreements on public broadcasters is complex, and largely beyond
the scope of this paper.  What follows are little more than early thoughts on the topic, with
reference to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).(128)
(i) Public mandate
The CBC is the basis of Canada’s public broadcasting system, dating back to 1929.(129)  Two
core elements of the CBC’s mandate are to provide programming that is “predominantly and
distinctively Canadian” and to “reflect Canada and its regions to national and regional
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audiences”.(130)  A recent mandate review of the CBC states that: “If anything, the
circumstances which gave birth to the CBC are even more pronounced today”.(131)
(ii) Direct impact and exception
It has been suggested that CBC programs would be protected from the impact of trade principles
under an exception for state (Crown) corporations.(132)  An exception would substantially save
CBC programs from the impact of MFN Treatment, National Treatment, a Prohibition on
Performance Requirements, and other trade principles which could otherwise have serious
implications for the CBC, as an arm of the Canadian government.
Whether future WTO agreements will include an exception for state corporations is uncertain,
although some arguments against such an exception have been expressed in the past.  In the WTO
case on Canadian magazine policies, for instance, the U.S. argued that:
... A WTO Member cannot create a government institution, allow it to take actions
inconsistent with the Member’s WTO obligations, and then claim it has no responsibility
for the actions of the institution.  The market access concessions that WTO Members
have negotiated over the years would not be secure if governments could escape their
obligation to provide national treatment to imported products by creating government
corporation and then claiming that they are not responsible for the discrimination
imposed by the entities they themselves created.
Thus, according to the argument, governments should not be allowed to avoid their obligations
under trade agreements by creating state corporations which are exempt from trade liberalization.
The argument was made regarding Canada Post’s funded postal rate scheme for Canadian
magazines.  However, it could be applied to the CBC as a state corporation which is specifically
mandated to support Canadian content in broadcasting.
(iii) Indirect impact
The impact of trade principles could also be felt indirectly by the CBC, outside of the protection
provided by a possible exception for state corporations.
For example, the CBC recently moved to an “all-Canadian” television format.(133)  To fulfill this
commitment, the CBC relies heavily on both public and private sources of funding which support
“Canadian content” co-productions in television.  “In this manner”, reports an industry analyst,
“the CBC is encouraged to leverage its scarce resources by licensing product from independent
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producers, who have a number of private and public sources of financing”.(134)  According to a
CBC source, these co-productions constitute the “vast majority” of CBC productions, since the
corporation generally “can’t afford to do in-house productions”.  Without funding support, “the
CBC Prime Time schedule would be virtually empty”.(135)
As noted earlier, National Treatment requires that funding programs not be “discriminatory”; i.e.
that they be open to foreign persons and companies.  For the CBC this could be a concern
because it would mean dividing up the limited “funding pie” for co-productions among a much
larger number of (mostly American) production companies.  Less money would be left to support
Canadian productions, as the funds became more and more dispersed among the newly-eligible
foreign companies.
3) Treatment of foreign versus domestic broadcasters
Based primarily on a review of the MAI, there are several ways in which future WTO agreements
may provide foreign broadcasters with rights that their domestic counterparts do not enjoy.
(i) Performance Requirements and National Treatment
First, a Prohibition on Performance Requirements may protect foreign investors without
providing the same protection for domestic investors.  This would allow a government to put
domestic content requirements on domestic broadcasters, but not foreign broadcasters.
This would not contradict the principle of National Treatment, which is designed to prevent
“discrimination” against foreign interests, even though domestic companies are receiving worse
treatment than foreign companies.  As currently defined, National Treatment requires that foreign
interests be treated no less favourably than domestic persons and companies, not that they be
treated the same.
(ii) Expropriation of Assets
Second, provisions on Expropriation of Assets under future WTO agreements may require that
foreign investors be compensated for a wide range of government measures which might directly
or indirectly reduce the value of their investments.  Domestic investors may be granted no such
protection, and would have to rely on relevant domestic law, which tends to be much more
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limited.(136)  An important point is that the MAI provisions on Expropriation of Assets would
protect foreign investors even if a government measure was non-discriminatory; that is, if it was
applied to domestic investors as well.(137)
(iii) Access to enforcement
Third, foreign investors are provided with access to an Investor-State enforcement mechanism
under both NAFTA and the MAI, while domestic investors are not.  According to one
commentator:
To use the Investor-State dispute settlement process, the MAI requires that there be some
international element involved in a dispute.  For example, Canadian investors are not
eligible to bring disputes against the Government of Canada; however, French or
Japanese investors can.  A glaring exception to this rule is that Canadian corporations
‘owned or controlled directly or indirectly’ by a citizen of another MAI country can bring
a claim against the Canadian government.  The term ‘investor’ is defined broadly to
include an individual or enterprise.(138)
This practice may be continued and entrenched under future WTO agreements.
Appendix One:
Elements of the proposed MAI
The MAI proposes broad restrictions on how governments can treat foreign investors and their
investments.  It proposes a very broad definition of “investment”.(139)  The definition goes well
beyond traditional notions of foreign direct investment (FDI) to include portfolio investment, debt
capital, intellectual property rights and every form of tangible or intangible assets.(140)
The MAI would apply the trade principles of MFN Treatment, National Treatment, Market
Access, a Prohibition on Performance Requirements, and Expropriation of Assets, among
others.(141)
These trade principles, and the policy restrictions which they entail, tend to expand on current
trade agreements.  Among other implications, they would:
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· Apply to all “government measures”, including legislation, regulations, governmental
policies and practices.(142)
 
· Apply to both national and subnational (i.e. state, provincial, territorial and local)
governments in ways that go beyond NAFTA and the current WTO agreements.(143)
 
· Apply the principle of National Treatment during the “pre-establishment phase” of an
investment, thereby prohibiting any foreign ownership restrictions.(144)
 
· Create an “effects test” to expand the requirement for providing National Treatment to
foreign investors.(145)
 
· Prohibit performance requirements on local sales, content, and production requirements;
employment requirements; and investment requirements.  This would expand on similar
NAFTA provisions, which contain exceptions relating to economic development or
health, safety and environmental standards.(146)
 
· Allow for foreign investors to sue governments directly, through international arbitration
panels or domestic courts, rather than having to rely on actions taken by their home
government.(147)
 
· Put a freeze (“standstill”) or a time limit (“rollback”) on exceptions to the
agreement.(148)
 
· Include a “lock in” of 15 years.(149)
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